I Four popular models of ambiguity-averse preferences
A typical decision problem under uncertainty involves a state space S that contains all possible states of nature. Only one of these states is (will be) true, but we do not know which one. By ∆(S) we denote the set of all probability measures (typically denoted p) over S. An act is a mapping from the state space S to a set of monetary outcomes.
Assuming a utility function mapping the outcomes to the reals, U p (f ) refers to the expected utility of act f if the probability distribution over S is p. Using this notation, Gilboa and Schmeidler's (1989) maxmin expected utility (MEU), also called multiple priors, holds if preferences can be represented by
where C is a subset of ∆(S) and is called the set of priors. C need not be equal to ∆(S), i.e., decision-makers may think that some probability distributions in ∆(S) are irrelevant or not possible. MEU is the basis of many results in economics and finance. For instance, James Dow and Sergio Ribeiro Da Costa Werlang (1992) , Larry G. Epstein and Tan Wang (1994) , among many others, have studied the implications of multiple priors in asset pricing. Introducing multiplier preferences, Lars Peter Hansen and Thomas J. Sargent (2001) showed how the robust-control theory applications used to account for model mispecification in macroeconomic modeling are related to MEU. Maccheroni, Marinacci and Rustichini (2006) proposed a general model, called variational preferences (VP), which captures both MEU and multiplier preferences. Under VP, preferences are represented by:
where c(p) : ∆(S) → [0, ∞] is an index of ambiguity aversion assigned to the probability distribution p. MEU is the special case of VP where c(p) = 0 if p ∈ C and c(p) = ∞ otherwise. Hansen and Sargent's (2001) multiplier preferences correspond to a case with c a function of relative entropy.
The α-maxmin model (αM), axiomatized by Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2004) , is a linear combination of maxmin expected utility and maxmax expected utility, in which not the worst but the best expected utility is considered. This model extends the well-known Hurwicz criterion to ambiguity. αM holds if preferences can be represented by:
The set of priors C and the parameter α may be interpreted as ambiguity and ambiguity attitude respectively. Consider the case of Ellsberg's three-color urn (an urn with 30 red balls and 60 balls that are either yellow or black in unknown proportion and where one ball is to be drawn at random) and an αM decision-maker who strictly prefers to bet on red rather than on yellow and also strictly prefers to bet on red rather than on black. A decision-maker of this type is clearly ambiguity averse and violates SEU. It can be shown that in such a case, α must be higher than 1/2. 
where µ is a subjective probability measure over ∆(S), that is, the measure of the subjective relevance of p ∈ ∆(S) to be the 'right' probability. Ambiguity attitude is captured by φ. More precisely, concavity of φ implies ambiguity aversion. For instance, a decisionmaker preferring to bet on red rather than on yellow and to bet on red rather than on black in Ellsberg's urn cannot have a convex φ. Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) defined ambiguity aversion as aversion to mean preserving spreads in terms of expected utility values and their model deals with ambiguity aversion as expected utility does with risk aversion. Hence, it is particularly convenient for applications (e.g., in macroeconomics, Hansen, 2007; in health and environmental policy, Nicolas Treich, 2010; in finance, Christian Gollier, 2009 ).
In the next two sections, we show precisely how Machina's examples pose difficulties for each of the four models presented above.
II The 50:51 example
The first example proposed by Machina (2009) is based on an urn with 101 balls. Fifty balls are marked with either 1 or 2 and 51 balls are marked with either 3 or 4. Each ball is equally likely to be drawn. E n denotes the event "a ball marked with a n is drawn". each, and such that E 3 and E 4 are equally-likely with probability 25.5 101 each. U (i,j) (f ) denotes the expected utility of act f if the distribution is characterized by (i, j) . In what follows, we often suppress f in U (i,j) (f ).
First consider MEU. For f 2 and f 3 , increasing i or j by 1 increases U (i,j) by 1. For f 4 , they increase U (i,j) by 2. As a consequence, a MEU decision-maker will take into account the minimum of i + j for f 2 , f 3 , and f 4 . The same prior can thus be applied to evaluate the four acts, the prior having no impact on the evaluation of the unambiguous act f 1 .
With the same prior for the four acts, we are back to SEU. Hence, MEU implies the same 2 Following Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005 , pp. 1875 -1876 , f 1 can be interpreted as a risky asset and f 2 as an ambiguous asset in a management portfolio problem. Asset f 3 (f 4 ) could be obtained by buying 2 units of f 1 (f 2 ) and one unit of f 2 (f 1 ), and by selling a riskless asset yielding 303 for sure. 3 We are grateful to a referee for bringing this point to our attention.
restriction as CEU (and SEU): f 1 f 2 if and only if f 3 f 4
Under αM, it can easily be shown that the same result holds. As with MEU, the priors that are used to evaluate f 1 , f 2 , f 3 and f 4 are the same. In the 50:51 example, αM corresponds to SEU with a specific probability distribution: α times the distribution that minimizes i + j plus (1 − α) times the distribution that maximizes i + j (over the set of priors C).
Result 1 in the Appendix establishes that an ambiguity-averse decision-maker, who prefers f 1 to f 2 , will violate 4 VP if f 3 ≺ f 4 . A similar result can be derived for KMM with φ concave. Using the functional given by (4), the values of the acts in the 50:51 example are:
, and 
Moreover, the difference between U (i,j) (f 1 ) and U (i,j) (f 2 ) on the one hand and
and U (i,j) (f 4 ) on the other hand is the same. 
which is not possible because φ(151) − φ(101
. This leads to a contradiction. A decision-maker with φ concave cannot exhibit both f 1 f 2 and f 3 ≺ f 4 . Note that this result can easily be extended to outcomes that are not equally spaced in terms of utility units, the proof being very similar.
To conclude this section, preferences that reflect the tradeoff between ambiguity and Bayesian advantages (f 1 f 2 and f 3 ≺ f 4 ) can be represented by none of the models
Figure 1: Impact of the concavity of φ on the evaluation of the acts examined.
III The reflection example
The second example proposed by Machina (2009) , the reflection example, entails a slight modification of the previous urn; not 51 but 50 balls are marked with a 3 or a 4. Table 2 describes four acts assigning outcomes evaluated in terms of utility to the four events (with 0 < π < 1). Unlike the previous example, this example does not require the outcomes to be equally-spaced on the utility scale.
50 balls 50 balls 
III.1 Decision criteria and experimental results
E 1 and E 2 (E 3 and E 4 ) are informationally symmetric: there is no more evidence in favor of one event or the other. Moreover, the two events E 1 ∪ E 2 and E 3 ∪ E 4 are equally likely. This is why Machina (2009) argues that f 8 is an (informationally symmetric) leftright reflection of f 5 , and f 7 is a left-right reflection of f 6 . As a consequence, there is no reason to prefer f 8 to f 7 if one prefers f 6 to f 5 . We will say that preferences should be reflected. Machina shows that under CEU, f 5 ≺ f 6 is equivalent to f 7 ≺ f 8 and thus preferences should not be reflected, unless indifference holds. Hence, CEU can only account for reflected preferences through indifference (f 5 ∼ f 6 and f 7 ∼ f 8 ). However, in an experimental study of the reflection example, L'Haridon and Placido (2010) showed that such indifferences are rejected (over 90% of the subjects expressed strict preferences when indifference was allowed) while reflected preferences hold for more than 70% of subjects. Their data thus reject CEU.
More can be said about the pattern of preferences over these acts. Maximizing expected utility assuming a uniform distribution over the four events implies indifference between the four acts, because they lead to the same expected utility. Decision-makers may have to find other criteria unless they accept to be indifferent. On the one hand, f 5 ≺ f 6 and f 7 f 8 can be justified in the light of Ellsberg, because f 6 and f 7 assign known probabilities to at least one outcome (100π). Furthermore, f 6 and f 7 are less exposed to ambiguity than f 5 and f 8 . 5 On the other hand, assuming some symmetry between E 2 and E 3 , f 5 f 6 and f 7 ≺ f 8 will hold for decision-makers who want to avoid mean preserving spreads in expected utility values (see Result 2 in the Appendix).
The aforementioned arguments do not allow us to clearly predict what the preferences should be. However, we can still let the data speak. Up to now, the only experimental test of the reflection example we are aware of was conducted by L'Haridon and Placido (2010). The typical preference pattern they found was f 5 ≺ f 6 and f 7 f 8 (46% of the participants), even if 28% of the subjects exhibited f 5 f 6 and f 7 ≺ f 8 . Furthermore, the experimenters replicated the Ellsberg paradox and found that f 5 ≺ f 6 and f 7 f 8 was still the most common pattern when only the subjects that are clearly ambiguity averse according to the Ellsberg paradox are considered. This confirms that ambiguity averse decision-makers tend to have this pattern of preferences. As a consequence, one might expect that a model of ambiguity aversion can account for f 5 ≺ f 6 and f 7 f 8 . This is what we will check for in the four models under consideration in this paper.
III.2 Analysis of the reflection example
In what follows, (k, t) denotes any possible probability distribution over the state space with k the number of balls marked with a 2 and t the number of balls marked with a 3.
Therefore, there are 50 − k balls with a 1 and 50 − t balls with a 4.
is the set of all possible (k, t) distributions.
5 Consider an act assigning 100π to E 1 , 100 to both E 2 and E 3 , and 0 to E 4 , and the following choice: remove 100(1 − π) from E 2 (yielding f 6 ) or remove the same amount from E 3 (yielding f 5 ). The former completely removes an exposure to ambiguity while the latter only decreases a previously-existing exposure to ambiguity. A similar reasoning applies to f 7 and f 8 .
First consider MEU. It can be shown that MEU will minimize some linear combinations of k and t in f 5 and f 8 whereas it minimizes only t in f 6 and only k in f 7 . It is thus impossible for both f 6 and f 7 to be preferred to f 5 and f 8 respectively (see Result 4 in the Appendix). However, f 5 f 6 and f 7 ≺ f 8 may hold. MEU predicts that, if preferences are reflected, an ambiguity averse decision-maker will prefer the acts in which none of the outcomes are associated with a known probability. and α = 1. Note that k = 50 or t = 50 are still possible independently. The maximum expected utility (50 + 50π) is still possible for f 6 and f 7 but not for f 5 and f 8 . Assume that π ≥ 1/2. The valuations of the acts are:
which is smaller than αM (f 6 ) = αM (f 7 ) = 50π + (1 − α)50. Assume that π < 1/2.
In such a case: αM (f 5 ) = αM (f 8 ) = 50π + (1 − α)(50 − π), which is also smaller than αM (f 6 ) = αM (f 7 ) = 50π + (1 − α)50. Thus, f 5 ≺ f 6 and f 7 f 8 can both hold.
However, this result relies on a choice of priors that does not seem consistent with the information provided in the (thought) experiment. One may think that the informational symmetry of the decision problem should be present in the set of priors. We will say that the set of priors replicates the informational symmetry of the decision problem if
replicates the informational symmetry, 6 f 5 ≺ f 6 (f 7 f 8 ) implies α < 1/2 (see Result 6).
As a consequence, either C does not replicate the informational symmetry or α < 1/2 (or both). In other words, decision-makers exhibiting f 5 ≺ f 6 and f 7 f 8 must change their preferences for some permutations of E 1 with E 2 , E 3 with E 4 , or (E 1 , E 2 ) with (E 3 , E 4 ) (if C does not replicate the informational symmetry, the numbers 1, 2, 3 and 4 must matter) or they must prefer to bet on the yellow and on the black balls rather than on the red balls in the Ellsberg urn 7 (otherwise, α cannot be smaller than 1/2).
Finally, let us study Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji's smooth model of ambiguity.
The preferences f 5 ≺ f 6 and f 7 f 8 imply that a KMM decision-maker cannot have a concave φ (see Result 7), no matter what µ is, i.e., whatever a KMM decision-maker thinks about the relevance of each probability distribution. Moreover, if this preference pattern does not depend on the outcomes under consideration, then φ must be convex.
On the other hand, if the Ellsberg paradox holds whatever the color and the outcomes, then φ must be concave. This leads to a contradiction.
To summarize our results, KMM with φ concave, VP, and MEU cannot represent the attraction most people seem to feel for acts including outcomes with objective probabilities. αM can accommodate such behavior but, to do so, it must violate either informational symmetry or Ellsberg preferences.
IV Implications of Machina's examples for other models
Up to now, we have focused on four models of ambiguity-averse preferences. Ehud Lehrer (2007a) analyzed the impact of the reflection example for two other models:
Lehrer's (2009) concave integral for capacities and Lehrer's (2007b) expected utility maximization w.r.t partially-specified probabilities. In both cases, he found that f 5 f 6 and f 7 ≺ f 8 , but not the opposite preferences that were experimentally found. As a consequence, these two models have the same prediction as MEU and VP for the reflection example. Kin Chung Lo (2009) ambiguous events (in the above examples, E 1 and E 2 on the one hand, and E 3 and E 4 on the other hand, have such complementarities) are represented by adjustment factors.
The second term of the VEU model is a function defined over these adjustment factors.
It is negative if Alain Chateauneuf and Jean-Marc Tallon's (2002) diversification axiom holds. Furthermore, it is negative and concave if Schmeidler's (1989) uncertainty aversion axiom holds. This axiom, which is necessary for VP and MEU, implies that "'smoothing'
[...] utility distributions makes the decision-maker better off" (Schmeidler, 1989, p.582) .
Siniscalchi (2009) showed that VEU can handle the preference patterns considered in the present paper with an adjustment function that is negative but not concave, 8 meaning that the diversification axiom holds, but the uncertainty aversion axiom does not.
9
A natural conjecture 10 is that the uncertainty aversion axiom drives most of the results in this paper. Without imposing further structure on preferences, this conjecture is false: Result 8 in the Appendix shows that some general preferences, satisfying the uncertainty aversion axiom, can accommodate Machina's paradoxes. However, the example we provide does not seem particularly intuitive; moreover, it is inconsistent with expected utility under risk.
As an alternative way to study the conjecture, we can impose more structure on preferences, for instance by assuming the standard independence axiom for expected utility under risk. Simone Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci and Luigi Montrucchio (2009) consider complete, transitive, monotonic and continuous preferences that satisfy uncertainty aversion and the independence axiom; they provide a representation for such preferences, which we shall call "uncertainty averse representation" (UAR). Cerreia-Vioglio et al. show that MEU, VP, and KMM with φ concave are all special cases of UAR. We 8 In both the 50:51 example and the reflection example, we can write the VEU value of act f as
, where x Ei denotes the utility value on event E i and p Ei denotes the (baseline) probability that a VEU decision-maker assigns to E i . The and uniform baseline probabilities, we can derive both f 1 f 2 and f 3 ≺ f 4 in the 50:51 example and f 5 ≺ f 6 and f 7 f 8 in the reflection example.
9 Because a VEU representation satisfying the uncertainty aversion axiom is a VP representation. 10 We thank a referee for this conjecture.
show in the Appendix that UAR can accommodate the 50:51 example (Result 9), but not the reflection example (Result 3). In consequence, Machina's reflection example calls for going beyond the class of uncertainty averse representations.
Result 1. In the 50:51 example, VP imply f 1 f 2 ⇒ f 3 f 4 .
We can define (i h , j h ) as any element of argmin (i,j)∈∆(S) {U (i,j) (f h ) + c(i, j)}. As a consequence, V P (f 1 ) = 151 + c(i 1 , j 1 ), V P (f 2 ) = 101 + i 2 + j 2 + c(i 2 , j 2 ), V P (f 3 ) = 100 + i 3 + j 3 + c(i 3 , j 3 ) and V P (f 4 ) = 50 + 2i 4 + 2j 4 + c(i 4 , j 4 ).
First, suppose that f 1 f 2 and f 3 ≺ f 4 . Hence, 50+c(i 1 , j 1 ) > i 2 +j 2 +c(i 2 , j 2 ). Replacing i 4 and j 4 by i 3 and j 3 in V P (f 4 ), because this can only increase the evaluation of the act, we obtain i 3 + j 3 > 50. By definition of (i 1 , j 1 ), c(i 1 , j 1 ) ≤ c(i 3 , j 3 ). The sum of these inequalities gives 50 + c(i 1 , j 1 ) < i 3 + j 3 + c(i 3 , j 3 ). As i 2 + j 2 + c(i 2 , j 2 ) = i 3 + j 3 + c(i 3 , j 3 ) must hold, we have 50 + c(i 1 , j 1 ) < i 2 + j 2 + c(i 2 , j 2 ). This leads to a contradiction.
Result 2. Assuming η(k, t) = η(t, k) ∀(k, t) ∈ ∆(S) (where η is a density defined over ∆(S)), f 6 (f 7 ) can be derived from f 5 (f 8 ) by a series of mean preserving spreads in terms of expected utility values.
Let η f h be the density function over the expected utility values induced by f h and η (h ∈ {5, 6}). We assume that η(k, t) = η(t, k). Note that:
For all (k, t) such that k = t, both η f 5 and η f 6 assign η(k, t) to k + 50π.
Let us now consider each (k, t) ∈ ∆(S) such that t < k and its symmetric distribution (t, k) (we are thus dealing with every case satisfying k = t). If 1/2 ≤ π < 1:
Otherwise (0 < π < 1/2):
Therefore, for all t < k and no matter what π is, η f 5 assigns η(k, t) and η(t, k) (which, by assumption, are equal) to intermediate values while η f 6 assigns them to extreme values, moving density from the center to the tails of the distribution. Moreover, the mean expected utility has not changed because 
where G is quasiconvex and non-decreasing in the first argument. We can define (k h , t h )
and
By definition of (k 6 , t 6 ) and (k 7 , t 7 ), we can infer:
Recall that 0 < π < 1. G must be non-decreasing in its first argument. Therefore, Eq.
10 implies k 5 < t 5 and Eq. 11 implies t 8 < k 8 . These two implications, Eqs. 12 and 13, and G being non-decreasing in its first argument imply:
and G (t 8 + 50π, (k 8 , t 8 )) < G (k 5 + 50π, (k 5 , t 5 )) .
The two inequalities (14) and (15) contradict each other.
Result 4. In the reflection example, MEU preferences f 5 ≺ f 6 and f 7 f 8 cannot both hold.
KM M (f 7 ) = ∆(S) φ(k + 50π)dµ(k, t), and KM M (f 8 ) = ∆(S) φ(t + (50 + k − t)π)dµ(k, t).
A preference for both f 6 and f 7 against f 5 and f 8 implies
∆(S)
[φ(t + (50 + t − k)π) − φ(t + 50π) + φ(k + (50 + k − t)π) − φ(k + 50π)]dµ(k, t) < 0.
However, if φ is concave, for all (k, t):
φ(t + (50 + t − k)π) − φ(t + 50π) + φ(k + (50 + k − t)π) − φ(k + 50π) ≥ 0.
To prove this, let us define a(k, t) = φ(t + (50 + k − t)π) − φ(t + 50π), and b(k, t) = φ(k + (50 + t − k)π) − φ(k + 50π).
Assume t ≥ k; hence, a(k, t) ≤ 0 and b(k, t) ≥ 0. Note that t+50π−(t+(50+k−t)π) = k + (50 +t−k)π −(k +50π) = (t−k)π > 0. Consequently, the same increase (i.e., (t−k)π ) of the argument of φ is applied to two different levels: k + 50π and t + (50 + k − t)π.
If t ≥ k, k + 50π ≤ t + (50 + k − t)π. φ being increasing and concave, the impact of an increase of the arguments in terms of φ units should be lower for the highest argument.
As a consequence, b(k, t) ≥ −a(k, t).
The opposite case k ≥ t is obtained by symmetry.
Result 8. Preferences satisfying the uncertainty aversion axiom are not incompatible with f 1 f 2 and f 3 ≺ f 4 , and with f 5 ≺ f 6 and f 7 f 8 .
Consider a preference relation represented by:
V (x E 1 , x E 2 , x E 3 , x E 4 ) = ln(3 + x E 1 ) · ln(3 + x E 3 ) + a ln(3 + x E 2 ) · ln(3 + x E 4 ),
with a > 0. V is defined on R 4 + and (x E 1 , x E 2 , x E 3 , x E 4 ) represents the utility values associated with E 1 , E 2 , E 3 , and E 4 respectively. V has a negative-definite Hessian matrix on R 4 + and therefore, V is strictly concave. This implies that the preference relation is complete and transitive (because the representation exists), monotone (because the function is monotone), and, above all, convex (because the function is concave).
Convexity (with respect to utility values) implies that the uncertainty aversion axiom, as defined by Schmeidler (1989), holds. It is then sufficient to note that at a = 
